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INTRODUCTION 
In this case, the interpretation of the Wrongful Lien Act proposed by Peterson 
Plumbing Supply (hereinafter "Peterson") is a limited revision of this Court's holding in 
Hutter to account for the provisions of Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) (2008). Under Peterson's 
interpretation, the holding in Hutter—that mechanics liens are not wrongful liens as 
defined in Utah Code § 38-9-1(6) because they are expressly authorized by statute—is 
narrowly modified to allow application of wrongful lien liability to a mechanics' lien if 
the person filing the lien lacks entitlement under Utah Code § 38-1-3. Under this 
interpretation, a mechanics' lien is not "expressly authorized by statute" if the person 
filing the lien is not "entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 
38-9-2(3) (2008). 
In contrast, General Construction & Development, Inc., et ah (hereinafter wtGCD") 
asks the Court to modify Hutter to include imposition of wrongful lien liability where the 
lien is procedurally defective; specifically where the lien is not timely filed. Under 
GCD's rule, every untimely mechanics' lien is a wrongful lien because the lien right has 
lapsed. Since there is no right to have a lien, any steps taken to file and enforce a lien are 
without legal authority and therefore wrongful. 
In proposing this rule, GCD fails to provide clear language in the statute to support 
its rule, identify why its rule should be limited to timing defects and not other procedural 
defects, or identify legislative intent for imposing such drastic liability on well-intended 
but ultimately unenforceable mechanics' lien claims. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
MECHANICS' LIEN NOTICES FILED BY PETERSON WERE NOT 
TIMELY. 
Peterson filed each of its liens within 90 days of the filing of the applicable Notice 
of Completion [R. 93-94, 320-22]. Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) provides that mechanics' 
lien claimants 
shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property, 
or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien 
within: (A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final completion of the original 
contract if no notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33; 0£ (B) 90 days 
after the day on which a notice of completion is filed under Section 38-1-33. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i) (2007) (emphasis added). 
The district court found that Peterson's liens were untimely since they were not 
filed within 180 days of final completion of the original contract. GCD defends the 
district court's interpretation with two arguments: (1) previous versions of the statute 
evidence that the amendment was meant as a clarification and not a substantive change in 
the law; and (2) Peterson's interpretation creates an absurd, unreasonable, and inoperable 
result. See Brief of Appellees at 6-12. 
A. The Amendment to Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) Constituted a Substantive 
Change in the Law. 
To successfully argue an amendment is a clarification, GCD must first show that 
Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) is ambiguous. As acknowledged by this Court, ww[o]nly if we 
find the statutory language to be ambiguous may we turn to secondary principles of 
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statutory construction or look to the statute's legislative history." State v. Ireland, 2006 
UT 174 11, 133 P-3d 396, 399 (Utah 2006). 
The reasoning behind this rule of statutory construction is sound: attorneys need to 
be able to rely on the plain and unambiguous language of the law. If an unambiguous 
statute is "clarified" by every subsequent version to mean something different, it 
suspends our ability to predictably guide our clients. Thus, 
[t]he starting point for this inquiry, as with all questions of statutory interpretation, 
is an examination of the plain language of the relevant statute[]. If the language is 
unambiguous, we confine our interpretation to the words of the [] statute[]. We 
seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations only 
if the statutory language is ambiguous or unclear. 
Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, ^  15, 227 P.3d 256, 260 (Utah 2010) (internal 
quotation marks and footnote omitted). In arguing that Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) is 
ambiguous, GCD asserts: 
A plain reading of the statute, without looking to the legislative history, reveals 
that the statute is ambiguous because it can conceivably be interpreted to mean: 1) 
that a filing of a notice of completion could extend the deadline past 180 days of 
completion, and 2) that a filing of a notice of completion cannot extend the 
deadline past 180 days. 
See Brief of Appellees at 7 (emphasis added). 
GCD's first interpretation comports with the interpretation advanced by Peterson: 
if a Notice of Completion is filed, then all liens are due "within: . . . (B) 90 days after the 
day on which a notice of completion is filed." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1 -7( 1 )(a)(i)(B) 
(2007). This is true even if the lien is filed more than 180 days after the deadline in 
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subsection (A) since subsection (A) is expressly inapplicable when a Notice of 
Completion is filed. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i)(A) (2007). 
In contrast, the second "conceivable" interpretation advanced by GCD is aptly 
described as "a forced reading of a clear and unambiguous statute." See Visitor Info. Ctr. 
Auth. v. Customer Serv. Div., Utah State Tax ComnTn, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 
1997). Moreover "conceivable" interpretations are not the standard for determining 
ambiguity. A statute is ambiguous only when "its terms are susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation." Hutter v. Dig-It Inc., 2009 UT 69, \ 49, 219 P.3d 918, 930 
(Utah 2009) (emphasis added). 
Since the second interpretation offered by GCD is forced and unreasonable, the 
plain language of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) is not ambiguous. There is absolutely 
nothing in the plain language of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) which states or otherwise 
implies the 180-day deadline is sacrosanct, or that the 90-day deadline is relative—rather 
than independent and alternative—to the 180-day deadline. Depending upon whether a 
Notice of Completion is filed, the plain language of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) clearly 
provides that either subsection (A) or (B) is applicable. 
Consequently, the Court's analysis of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) is not dependent 
upon the legislative history of the statute, prior versions of the statute, or a subsequent 
version of the statute. "Unless the statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no 
need to delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history." Visitor Info. Ctr. Auth. v. 
Customer Serv. Div., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997). 
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Although Peterson believes the foregoing analysis is persuasive and conclusive, a 
full rebuttal and an abundance of caution dictates that Peterson address the arguments 
presented by GCD that the statutory history of Utah Code § 38-1-7 and the Utah Senate 
floor debates show that the 2009 amendment to Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) was a 
clarification and not a substantive change in the law. 
As an initial matter, wt[l]ater versions of a statute do not necessarily reveal the 
intent behind an earlier version." Id In many cases, the "legislative change supports the 
proposition that the statute previously meant something different from what it now says." 
See id Accordingly, ww[w]e generally presume that any amendment to a statute indicates a 
legislative intent to change existing legal rights and therefore is not a reliable indication 
of intent as to the earlier, unamended statute." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ^ |24, 66 
P.3d 592, 599-600 (Utah 2003). 
A party seeking to convince the Court that an amendment was intended by the 
legislature to "clarify the ambiguities in the statute rather than to change the law" must 
rebut the "general rule" by presenting evidence sufficient to demonstrate "a strong 
indication that clarification was, in fact, the legislative intent." Hutter v. Dig-It., Inc., 
2009 UT 69, lj 16, 219 P.3d 918, 923 (Utah 2009). GCD has failed to meet this burden. 
In support of its contention that the 2009 amendment to Utah Code § 38-1-7 
(2007) was a clarification and not a substantive change, GCD states that fck[t]he statutory 
history of the Utah Mechanics' Lien Act shows that the legislature did not intend for a 
Notice of Completion to allow an undeterminable amount of time to file a mechanics' 
5 
lien notice." See Brief of Appellee at 7-8. GCD then sets forth the language of the 1884, 
1898, 1953, 2006, 2008 and 2009 versions of Utah Code § 38-1-7 and asserts that 
uCPeterson Plumbing's interpretation of [Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007)] is a drastic departure 
from all prior and subsequent versions inasmuch as this is the only version, according to 
Peterson Plumbing, that has an infinite time period to file a mechanics' line notice." See 
Brief of Appellee at 8-10. 
This hyperbolic assertion is misleading for the following reasons: (1) the 
interpretation advanced by Peterson does not result in an infinite time period to pursue a 
mechanics' lien claim; (2) the liens in this case were not filed at an infinite time after the 
180-day deadline; and (3) filing a Notice of Completion is a purely voluntary act. 
Taking these in reverse order, the Court should note that the filing of a Notice of 
Completion, like those filed here, is a purely voluntary act. Under Utah Code § 38-1-33, 
the filing of a Notice of Completion is permissive and can only be accomplished by a 
select group of entities. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-33(l)(a) (2008). Why would a 
person file one at some unimaginably late date? Since the filing of a Notice of 
Completion is an absolute predicate to the operation of the 90-day deadline, no lien right 
will exist beyond the 180-day deadline when no Notice of Completion is filed. 
Moreover, the liens at issue in this case were not filed at some alarmingly late 
date. All of Peterson's liens were recorded within days of each other, and several of 
those liens were timely and have been foreclosed in another pending case. See Fourth 
District Case No. 080404372. The liens at issue in this case were filed beyond the 180-
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day deadline but only by a matter of days. GCD ignores the proximity of the actual lien 
filings to the 180-day deadline and the fact the GCD itself opened the door for the liens at 
issue in this case by filing the Notices of Completion. 
GCD distracts the Court from these facts with polemical expressions of infinite 
deadlines which will never matter because the lien deadline ruling in this case will apply 
only to this case. The Utah legislature amended section 38-1-7 in 2009 to read that the 
180-day deadline is the absolute deadline regardless of whether a Notice of Completion is 
filed. Since the decision of this Court will affect only the rights of the parties in this case, 
we should restrict our analysis to the facts of this case and not an academically intriguing 
but ultimately inapplicable hypothetical. 
Furthermore, the interpretation advanced by Peterson does not result in an infinite 
time period to pursue a mechanics' lien claim. Pursuant to subsection (A), a lien 
claimant must file a notice of lien within 180 days after the date of final completion of 
the original contract if a Notice of Completion is not filed. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-
7(l)(a)(i)(A) (2007). If a Notice of Completion is filed, subsection (B) dictates that a lien 
claimant must file a lien within 90 days after the filing of the Notice of Completion. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(l)(a)(i)(B) (2007). While this may result in a lien being filed 
more than 180 days after final completion of the original contract, the underlying statutes 
of limitations for the enforcement of contractual and equitable debts will prevent a lien 
claim from being enforceable after the running of the applicable statute of limitations. 
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The right to a mechanics' lien is ancillary to a debt and merely secures the 
underlying obligation. The Court of Appeals acknowledged the interconnectedness of 
lien and monetary claims when it described breach of contract claims as "inextricably 
tied" to mechanics' lien claims: wca party cannot pursue [a mechanics' lien claim] without 
also proving the existence of a contract, a payment due under the contract, and a breach 
of that contract by nonpayment." Ellsworth Paulsen Const. Co. v. 51-SPR, L.L.C., 2006 
UT App. 353,11 47, 144 P.3d 261, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 
The statute of limitations for an oral contract is four years from the nonpayment 
and six years with respect to the breach of a written contract. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-2-307(3) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-309 (2010). Since the Mechanics' Lien 
Act provides for attorneys' fees to the successful party, see Utah Code § 38-1-18 (2010), 
it is doubtful that a lien would ever be filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations 
because the property owner would be entitled to costs and attorneys' fees as the 
successful party . 
Contrary to GCD's assertion, the interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) 
advocated by Peterson does not produce a "drastic departure from all prior and 
subsequent versions" since it does not result in an infinite and undeterminable time 
period to pursue a mechanics" lien claim. As a result, comparing Utah Code § 38-1-7 
(2007) with its prior and subsequent versions and arguing that fctthe legislature did not 
intend for a Notice of Completion to allow an undeterminable amount of time to file a 
mechanics' lien notice" does not support GCD's contention that the 2009 amendment to 
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Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) was meant as a clarification and not a substantive change in 
the law. 
GCD's second argument for clarification is based upon a statement made by 
Senator Jenkins in a senate floor debate: 
On line 42, 90 days after the date of the notice completed, but no later than the, it's 
the 180 days that's on line 40. So it can be no later than the 180 days on line 40. 
So, it's just a clarification. 
See Brief of Appellees at 12. Like the "general statement" made by Representative 
Morely quoted in Hutter, this general statement by one senator is "too slender a reed 
upon which to rest a general conclusion" that the 2009 amendment was intended by the 
legislature as a clarification of the law and not a substantive change in the law. See 
Hutter v. Dig-It., Inc., 2009 UT 69, \ 16, 219 P.3d 918, 923 (Utah 2009). 
In sum, GCD has failed to present evidence strongly indicating that the 2009 
amendment to Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) was intended by the legislature as a 
clarification of the law and not a substantive change in the law. 
While it is true that an amendment to an ambiguous statute may indicate a 
legislative purpose to clarify the ambiguities in the statute rather than to change 
the law, this is not the general rule, and this view of an amendment should be 
taken only where there is a strong indication that clarification was, in fact, the 
legislative intent. 
Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc., 2009 UT 69,1| 16, 219 P.3d 918, 923 (Utah 2009) (internal 
quotations and footnote omitted). Consequently, the Court should find that the district 
court erred in interpreting Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) as creating a maximum lien filing 
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deadline of 180 days from the date of final completion of the original contract even if the 
Court finds that Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) is ambiguous. 
B. Peterson's Plain-Language Interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) is Not 
Absurd, Unreasonable, or Inoperable. 
GCD's second argument in defense of the district court's interpretation of Utah 
Code § 38-1-7 (2007) is that Peterson's plain-language interpretation of the statute 
"creates an absurd, unreasonable and inoperable result." See Brief of Appellees at 12-15. 
In support of this assertion, GCD opines that ww[u]nder Peterson Plumbing's interpretation 
of the statute, a mechanics' lien notice could theoretically be filed years, decades or even 
centuries after the completion of the final contract" since "Peterson Plumbing argues that 
the 2007 version does not have any determinable time frame in which a mechanics' lien 
can be filed." See Brief of Appellees at 13. 
As already noted, this hyperbolic misrepresentation of the interpretation advocated 
by Peterson is not accurate: mechanics' lien claims would still be extinguished within 
four to six years of final completion of the original contract by the expiration of the 
applicable statute of limitations on the underlying breach of contract claim. Moreover, 
the liens in this case were filed only days after the 180-day deadline. Upon those facts of 
timing, the result is not absurd, unreasonable, or inoperable. 
GCD's final argument, that Peterson's interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) 
is superfluous, overlooks the word "or" and the phrase "if no notice of completion is filed 
under section 38-1-33." See Brief of Appellees at 14. Statutes should be interpreted "to 
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give meaning to all parts." LKL Associates, Inc. v. Farley. 2004 UT 51, U 7, 94 P.3d 279, 
281 (Utah 2004). 
If a Notice of Completion is filed, then subsection (B) controls and the only 
applicable deadline is the 90-day deadline. If a Notice of Completion is not filed, then 
subsection (A) controls and the only applicable deadline is the 180-day deadline. There 
is nothing superfluous about one deadline controlling in the event that a Notice of 
Completion is filed and another deadline controlling in if a Notice of Completion is not 
filed. Accordingly, the Court should conclude that Peterson's plain-language 
interpretation of Utah Code § 38-1-7 (2007) is not absurd, unreasonable, or inoperable. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETERSON'S 
MECHANICS' LIENS WERE WRONGFUL LIENS. 
The district court relied on Foothill Park, L.C. v. Jndston, Inc., 2008 UT App. 113, 
182 P.3d 924 (Utah Ct. App. 2008), in concluding that Peterson's mechanics' liens were 
wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act. Likewise, GCD primarily relies on Foothill Park 
to support the district court's conclusion. However, this reliance is misplaced for the 
reasons set forth in the Opening Brief of the Appellant Peterson: the liens are expressly 
authorized by statute and they fall with the scope limitation of Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) 
(2008). 
A. Peterson's Mechanics' Liens are Expressly Authorized by Statute. 
A lien is not a wrongful lien if it is wwexpressly authorized by . . . statute." See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-9-1(6) (2008). GCD presents five arguments in support of its 
assertion that Peterson's mechanics' liens were not expressly authorized by statute: (1) 
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the holding of the Court of Appeals in Foothill Park] (2) GCD's interpretation of the 
Court's holding in Hutter, (3) Foothill Park and Hutter are distinguishable; (4) wrongful 
liens are determined at the time a lien is recorded; and (5) the holding of the Court of 
Appeals in cases involving lis pendens. See Brief of Appellees at 15-19. These 
arguments shall be addressed in turn. 
First, GCD asserts that the Court of Appeals addressed whether a mechanics' lien 
is "expressly authorized by . . . statute" under section 38-9-1(6) "when [the Court of 
Appeals] stated that 'the statute is not so broad as to exempt any filing that purports to 
arise under the mechanics' lien statute/" See Brief of Appellees at 16 (quoting Foothill 
Park. L.C. v. Judston, Inc., 2008 UT App. 113,1f 19, 182 P.3d 924 (Utah Ct. App. 2008)). 
However, the Court of Appeals was referring to the scope limitation in section 38-
9-2(3), not the wrongful lien definition in section 38-9-1(6). Indeed, the Court of 
Appeals did not explicitly address the definitional issue of whether a lien is "authorized 
by . . . statute" in rendering its decision in Foothill Park. kL ^ 18-20. Its analysis was 
confined solely to the scope limitation in section 38-9-2(3). Id This likely explains why 
the Court referred to the portion of Foothill Park quoted by GCD as "dicta" in rendering 
its decision in Hutter. See Hutter v. Dig-It Inc., 2009 UT 69, \ 49, n.31, 219 P.3d 918, 
929-30, n.31 (Utah 2009). As a result, GCD reliance upon Foothill Park with respect to 
the issue of whether a lien is "expressly authorized by . . . statute" under section 38-9-
1 (6) is misplaced. 
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Second, GCD argues that the Court's holding in Hutter "does not mean that any 
document created or filed purporting to be a mechanics' lien is expressly authorized by 
statute" and that "pursuant to Hutter, an untimely mechanics' lien is still a wrongful lien 
because there is no statutory right to file a belated mechanics' lien." See Brief of 
Appellants at 15-17. In making this argument, however, GCD ignores the Court's 
framing of the issue decided in Hutter, the legislative history quoted by the Court in 
Hutter, the Court's rejection of Foothill Park in Hutter, the Court's actual determination 
in Hutter of what it means to be "expressly authorized by . . . statute," and the distinction 
between the "right" to file a mechanics' lien and the statutory "nature" of a mechanics' 
lien. 
Since Foothill Park did not address the issue of express authorization, the only 
guiding precedent is the Court's holding in Hutter whereby it explained "the meaning of 
the phrase 'expressly authorized.'" See Hutter v. Dig-It Inc.. 2009 UT 69, ]\ 46, 219 P.3d 
918, 929 (Utah 2009). In Hutter, Dig-It argued "that because the right to file a 
mechanics' lien is granted by statute, all mechanics' liens—even if they ultimately prove 
unenforceable-are expressly authorized by statute and therefore are not wrongful liens." 
Id. K 46. This is the position being argued by Peterson in this case. 
In contrast, the Hutters argued "that an unenforceable lien cannot be expressly 
authorized by statute since the statute only allows liens to be recorded that comply with 
the statutory terms." h i ^ 46. This was the position correctly rejected by the Court in 
Hutter and is the position being argued by GCD in this case. 
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After acknowledging that the phrase "expressly authorized" was ambiguous, the 
Court related the following legislative history, which is just as applicable and controlling 
in this case as it was in Hutter. 
The Wrongful Lien Act was originally enacted by the legislature in 1985 and was 
last amended in 1997. Senator Matheson, a sponsor of the original bill, stated that 
its purpose was to impose penalties on those filing common law liens on the 
property of public officials in retaliation for prosecution. After making his initial 
statement, Senator Matheson was questioned by Senator Carling, who was 
concerned that the original bill's definition of a wrongful lien was too broad for 
the bill's expressed purpose. Senator Carling's question precipitated the following 
exchange: 
Senator Carling: Mr. President, . . . I thought this just went to common law 
liens, but apparently Senator Matheson, [you're] enacting a whole new 
section and that whole new section it appears goes to all liens, not just 
common law liens and it would go to rental liens, lessors liens, . . . 
mechanic's liens and the thing that concerns me, I . . . agree with what you're 
trying to do and the problem that you have but I think that you're going 
further than you intended to go because somebody might think that they have 
a valid lien against somebody, they're going to file a lien and it might be 
determined to be invalid. One of the things that it says here, uh, they assert a 
lien and then you look at line 27, page 1 it says [wC]or is otherwise invalid,["] . 
. . that kind of covers the whole waterfront, I don't see a problem where it 
says he [ww] knows or has reason to know that the document is forged, 
groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim,["] but. . . where 
we're putting even a little bit of negligence in here I wonder why you need 
[ww]or otherwise invalid,^] that seems to be a little too broad. 
Senator Matheson: Now Mr. President, I'd have no objections to taking that 
out. You know the purpose of the bill and that's to cover all of you . . . [who] 
might. . . find yourself in the same position if you resist what these people 
are attempting to do. 
Senator Moll: . . . I believe you already know the purpose of the bill and that 
is to take care of. . . the problems raised by [some groups] in this state . . . 
where as a punitive measure if we don't do it their way they file what we call 
common law liens with recorders who are hard put to know whether they 
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even file them or whether they have any liability. . . . [I]t addresses only liens 
on real property and I suggested some language to . . . Senator Matheson,. . . 
which says in effect, this act shall have no application to . . . [mechanic's] or 
materialmen's liens and I believe that that would clear it up and express the . 
. . intent of the body. . . . 
Senator Matheson: Now Mr. President, I'd move under suspensions of rules 
[clause] it is fourteen words that we add the language which Mr. [Moll] has 
just said at the end of or after line 33 on page 1, "This act is not intended to 
be applicable to mechanic's or materialmen's liens." 
14150. 
GCD offers no legislative history to contradict the legislative history relied upon 
by the Court in Hutter or to support GCD's position for an expanded definition and 
application of the term wtexpressly authorized by . . . statute." Nevertheless, GCD goes 
beyond the acknowledged intent of the statute, the legislative history, and the holding of 
Hutter by inviting the Court to expand application of the Wrongful Lien Act to all 
untimely liens. 
This argument, and others like it inviting the Court to focus on the lien process 
rather than the lien claimant, is a common mistake made by those intent on punishing 
unsuccessful lien claimants and the same mistake made by the Court of Appeals in 
Foothill Park. The Wrongful Lien Act contained an express exemption for mechanics 
liens when it was originally passed in 1985. Although the express exemption was 
removed when Section 38-9-2(3) was added in 1997, there is nothing in the legislative 
history to suggest that the legislature sought to change the objective of the Wrongful Lien 
Act or the policy underlying the Act: the prevention of frivolous common law liens. 
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Rather, the amendment expressed what the legislature always intended: that the 
person filing a lien be of the type qualified to file the lien. Under the original version of 
the Wrongful Lien Act, the express exemption for mechanics' liens created the 
opportunity for a person to avoid wrongful lien liability by filing a common law lien 
denominated as a mechanics' lien. While this may have complied with the express 
language of the Act, it did not comport with the intent. The addition of section 38-9-2(3) 
allows a court to look beyond the face of the document to determine whether the person 
is of the class qualified to file the lien. The inquiry ends there. 
Accordingly, the focus of a section 38-9-2(3) inquiry is on the "person" filing the 
lien, not the process. Although noncompliance with procedural requirements may result 
in a loss of the right to a mechanics' lien, i.e. a lien right may have expired based upon a 
failure to timely file a notice of lien, the timing of the filing of a mechanics' lien notice 
does not change the qualification of the person filing the lien. Consequently, the Court's 
appropriately broad holding in Hutter is controlling in this case and leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that untimely mechanics' liens are not wrongful liens under the 
Wrongful Lien Act. 
Third, GCD argues that Foothill Park and Hutter are ^distinguishable" since 
Foothill Park dealt with a "timeliness issue" and implies that Hutter is not applicable 
because it did not. See Brief of Appellees at 17. However, this observation is a 
distinction without a difference in light of the Court's explicit characterization of the 
issue decided in Hutter as one that had been addressed in dicta by the Court of Appeals in 
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Foothill Park, and the Court of Appeals' erroneous application of timing to the analysis 
of whether a mechanics lien is wrongful. 
As already noted, the issue before the Court in Flutter was "the meaning of the 
phrase 'expressly authorized/" Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc., 2009 UT 69, \ 46, 219 P.3d 918, 
929 (Utah 2009). After rehearsing the competing interpretations proposed by Dig-It and 
the Hutters, the Court referred to Foothill Park in explaining that wC[t]his issue is one of 
first impression for this court, although the Court of Appeals has addressed it in dicta." 
Id T| 49. The Court thereafter made it clear that the dicta to which it was referring was 
the Court of Appeals' conclusion in Foothill Park that "the [Wrongful Lien Act] is not so 
broad as to exempt any filing that purports to arise under the [mechanic's] lien statute." 
141149,^31. 
In concluding that "the legislature intended that the definition of'wrongful lien' 
should encompass only common law liens" and that "the phrase 'not expressly authorized 
by . . . statute' in the Wrongful Lien Act does not include statutorily created liens that 
ultimately prove unenforceable," it is clear that the Court overruled the Court of Appeals' 
dicta. Id H 52. Since the issue in this case is the same issue addressed in Hutter and the 
dicta in Foothill Park, and the Court implicitly overruled the dicta in Foothill Park, any 
distinguishing characteristics between the facts of the two cases are irrelevant: Hutter is 
controlling. 
Fourth, GCD points out that "a wrongful lien is determined at the time it is 
recorded or filed." See Brief of Appellees at 16. While this is true, it does not change the 
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relevant inquiry from the person to the process. The timing of a lien does not convert the 
lien from a statutorily created right to a common law right. An untimely, statutory lien is 
still a statutorily created lien; it's just going to be unenforceable. As this Court 
acknowledged in Hutter, an unenforceable lien is not a wrongful lien. Id. j^ 52. 
Finally, GCD relies on two cases decided by the Court of Appeals involving lis 
pendens to support their assertion that a mechanics' lien that "is not timely filed [] can be 
a wrongful lien under the Wrongful Lien Statute." See Brief of Appellees at 18. 
However, the cases cited by GCD do not support their position for the same reason as 
Foothill Park: the Court of Appeals did not substantively address whether the mechanics' 
lien/lis pendens in each case were "expressly authorized by . . . statute." 
With respect to the first case cited by GCD, it is a misrepresentation of the Court 
of Appeals' holding in Doug Jessop Const., Inc. v. Anderton, 2008 UT App 348, 195 
P.3d 493 (Utah Ct. App. 2008), to argue that "the Court of Appeals held that a lis 
pendens was a wrongful lien because it preceded the filing of the counterclaim and was 
therefore not timely filed." See Brief of Appellee at 18. The Court of Appeals did not 
engage in any analysis of whether the lis pendens was "expressly authorized by . . . 
statute" and certainly did not find that it was a wrongful lien based upon the timeliness of 
its filing. See Doug Jessop Const., Inc. v. Anderton, 2008 UT App 348, 195 P.3d 493 
(Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
What actually happened is the "Appellants failed to preserve their claim that a lis 
pendens is not a lien for purposes of the wrongful lien statute as well as the issue of 
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whether a lis pendens can be removed pursuant to the wrongful lien statute." Id. ^ 19. 
As a result, the Court of Appeals "deem[ed] these arguments waived and [did] not reach 
their merits." Id It was upon this basis that the Court of Appeals refused to "disturb the 
trial court's judgment that the first lis pendens was a wrongful lien," not that the Court of 
Appeals agreed with the trial court's conclusion. Id. 
With respect to the second case cited by GCD, the Court of Appeals' ruling in 
Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243, 166 P.3d 639 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) suffers 
from the same problem as its dicta in Foothill Park: in both cases the Court of Appeals 
did not consider the ambiguity inherent in the phrase "expressly authorized by . . . 
statute." Id ^ 46-50. In fact, in Farnsworth (like Hutter) the claim giving rise to the lis 
pendens failed. Nevertheless, the lis pendens in Farnsworth and the lien in Hutter were 
not found to be wrongful. Moreover, like Foothill Park, Farnsworth was decided by the 
Court of Appeals prior to the Court's seminal ruling in Hutter regarding what it means 
for a lien to be "expressly authorized by . . . statute." As a result, Farnsworth was also 
overruled by Hutter to the extent it conflicts with the Court's holding in Hutter. 
In sum, the liens filed by Peterson were mechanics' liens, not common law liens. 
Even if the notice of liens were untimely, the timing of the liens does not change the 
nature of the liens from mechanics' liens to common law liens. Under Hutter, 
mechanics' liens are "expressly authorized by . . . statute" without respect to their 
enforceability. As a result, the Wrongful Lien Act is inapplicable even if the Court finds 
that Peterson's mechanics' liens were untimely filed and unenforceable. 
19 
B. Peterson is "Entitled to a Lien under Section 38-1-3." 
The Wrongful Lien Act "does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 
38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 38-9-2(3) (2008). GCD presents two awkward arguments in rebuttal to 
Peterson's interpretation of this section: (1) it renders portions of the statute "superfluous 
and inoperative"; and (2) wtinnocent homeowners could face severe consequences" if an 
untimely filed mechanics' lien does not subject the lien claimant to wrongful lien 
liability. See Brief of Appellant at 19-22. 
GCD's first argument, that Peterson's interpretation of Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) 
renders portions of the statute superfluous and inoperative, is based on an incomplete 
application of Peterson's argument. Whether a person is "entitled to a lien under Section 
38-1-3" is determined solely by reference to section 38-1-3. The question of 
"entitlement" is the first prong in the analysis and is discussed at length on pages 20-27 
of the Opening Brief of Peterson. 
The second prong requiring that the lien claimant file a lien "pursuant to Title 38, 
Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens" represents a requirement that a "mechanics' lien" be filed 
rather than a "common law lien" masquerading as a mechanics lien, not a requirement 
that a lien claimant "entitled to a lien under section 38-1-3" must also comply with the 
procedural, content, service, and timing provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Act. 
In contrast, GCD wants the Court to conclude the phrase tcwho files a lien pursuant 
to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens" means that the lien must be filed in full 
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compliance with timing provisions of Utah Code § 38-1-1, et. seq. This is the same 
argument made to support GCD's interpretation of "express authorization" and is the 
same argument rejected in Hutter because it is not supported by the plain language or 
legislative history of the statute. 
GCD's second argument in rebuttal to Peterson's interpretation of Utah Code § 
38-9-2(3) is that innocent homeowners could face severe consequences if an untimely 
filed mechanics' lien does not subject the lien claimant to wrongful lien liability under 
the Wrongful Lien Act. However, this argument is based on an unreasonable 
hypothetical that fails to take into consideration the other protections afforded to 
homeowners under other statutes. The basis for GCD's argument is as follows: 
Under Peterson Plumbing's interpretation, a contractor who did work on the 
property at the instance of the owner could theoretically file a mechanics' lien 
notice at any time without any danger of it being a wrongful lien, even if the 
contractor filed the lien for purely malicious purposes. A contractor could wait 10 
years or more and file a mechanics' lien out of spite right before a home owner 
was going to sell the home or refinance. The home owner would have no speedy 
remedy to remove the mechanics' lien from the property without the option of the 
Wrongful Lien Statute. 
Brief of Appellees at 21. 
In making yet another argument premised on a bizarre and distinct fact scenario, 
GCD does not propose that this wildly belated lien would be enforceable. Rather, GCD 
objects to the lack of ability to speedily remove the lien with the expedited procedures of 
the Wrongful Lien Act. Those facts are not the facts of this case, and the issue raised by 
GCD—the speedy removal of untimely filed mechanics' liens—is one of policy and not 
statutory interpretation. The Court should reject GCD's request for judicial activism. 
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Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that GCD's hyperbolic fact scenario would ever 
materialize. It has already been noted supra that the right to a mechanics' lien is founded 
upon a debt and merely secures the underlying obligation. Accordingly, mechanics' lien 
claims are extinguished within four to six years of final completion of the original 
contract by the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations on the underlying breach 
of contract claim. Since the Mechanics' Lien Act provides for attorneys' fees to the 
successful party, see Utah Code § 38-1-18 (2010), it is highly unlikely that a mechanics' 
lien notice would ever be filed where the debt cannot be enforced. 
In the unlikely event that a notice of lien was filed thereafter, the property owner is 
not without relief. It could bring a declaratory judgment action, file a motion for 
summary judgment, and would be entitled to costs and attorneys' fees as the successful 
party if an action was filed under the Mechanics' Lien Act. See UTAH R. Civ. P. 54(d) 
(2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-18 (2010). As acknowledged by this Court: 
If Utah's mechanics' lien is a statutory creature, then section 38-1-18 is one of that 
creature's sharper claws. . . . it has the effect of discouraging abuse of the lien 
process by creating a strong disincentive for a would-be litigant to wrongfully 
inflict a mechanic's lien on a property owner whose property was not actually 
enhanced. . . . section 38-1-18 should also discourage the filing of frivolous and 
unsupportable mechanic's liens, because a mechanic's lien plaintiff who is not 
successful must pay the defendant's attorney fees. 
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, \ 24, 94 P.3d 270, 276-
77 (Utah 2004). 
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In the even unlikelier event that a mechanics' lien was spitefully or maliciously 
filed by a contractor, the contractor would be subject to criminal charges and liable to the 
homeowner under the "abusive lien"1 provisions of the Mechanics" Lien Act: 
(1) Any person entitled to record or file a lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim of lien against any property 
containing a greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or filed: (a) with the 
intent to cloud the title; (b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of 
the excessive claim of lien more than is due; or (c) to procure any unjustified 
advantage or benefit. 
(2) In addition to any criminal penalties under Subsection (1), a person who 
violates Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the property or an original 
contractor or subcontractor who is affected by the lien for the greater of: (a) twice 
the amount by which the abusive lien exceeds the amount actually due; or (B) the 
actual damages incurred by the owner of the property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-25 (2010). 
In light of the foregoing, it is not practical to hypothecate that a contractor would 
wait 10 years or more to file a mechanics' lien out of spite or malice. If it did happen, the 
homeowner could file an action directly against the contractor under Utah Code § 38-1-
25 (the action accrues when the lien is recorded, not when the lien claimant forecloses on 
the lien). As a result, applying the Wrongful Lien Act to mechanics' liens is unnecessary 
for the purpose of deterring unscrupulous contractors from abusing innocent 
homeowners. 
In describing the lien filed by someone under subsection (1), the legislature substituted 
the word "abusive" for "wrongful" in 2007. However, Utah Code § 38-1-18 still refers 
the lien as "a wrongful lien." See Utah Code § 38-1-18 (2010). Accordingly, the 
Mechanics' Lien Act has its own definition of, and sets forth its own penalties for, the 
filing of a "wrongful" mechanics' lien. See Utah Code § 38-1-18 & 25 (2010). 
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In sum, whether or not a person is "entitled to a lien" is defined by Utah Code § 
38-1-3. Whether or not the person "files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, 
Mechanics' Liens" is defined by whether the lien ultimately filed is a mechanics' lien. 
Whether or not the lien is enforceable is defined by the rest of the Mechanics' Lien Act, 
including the timing provisions of Utah Code §§ 38-1-7 & 11. Although GCD would like 
to convince the Court that entitlement to a mechanics' lien under Utah Code § 38-1-3 
should include a requirement that a mechanics' lien notice must be timely filed, such a 
requirement shifts the focus of Utah Code § 38-9-2(3) from the person filing the lien to 
the process by which the lien is filed in violation of the rules of statutory construction. 
III. GCD'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES IS PREMATURE. 
GCD concludes the Brief of Appellees with a request for an award of costs and 
attorneys fees' under the Wrongful Lien Act and the Mechanics' Lien Act. Since this 
appeal is from an interlocutory order, GCD's request is premature: 
This is an interlocutory appeal; final judgment has yet to be entered. Under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), an award of costs is to be given to the 
^prevailing party" and is to "abide the final determination of the cause." In 
interpreting this provision, we embrace the rule promulgated by the Arizona 
Supreme Court: "Unless provided by statute, there shall be no application for costs 
or attorneys' fees made . . . in connection with a petition for review by 
interlocutory appeal. . . . [IJssues of costs and attorneys' fees, if any, shall abide 
the final resolution of the adjudication." In Re Rights to the Use of the Gila River, 
171 Ariz. 230, 830 P.2d 442, 458 (1992). We therefore instruct the district court to 
evaluate [the Appellee's] request for costs and attorney fees incurred in defending 
against this interlocutory appeal when the case is finally resolved and it can 
identify the prevailing party. 
Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37,1j 39, 140 P.3d 1210, 1218 (Utah 2006). 
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If the Court does see fit to make an award of costs and attorneys' fees, Peterson 
respectfully requests an award of costs and attorneys' fees from the Court pursuant to 
Utah Code § 38-9-7(5)(c) (2010) and Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
since the posture of this case dictates that an award cannot be made pursuant to the 
Mechanics' Lien Act. To invoke the provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Act, Peterson 
would have had to file a complaint seeking to foreclose its mechanics' liens. Compare 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11(2) (2010) ("A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce 
the lien filed under this chapter ") with UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-18 (2010) ("in any 
action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee."). 
This case did not involve an action "brought" by Peterson "to enforce" a 
mechanics' lien, but rather an action brought by GCD to nullify a mechanics' lien under 
the Wrongful Lien Act. Accordingly, the attorneys' fee provision found in the 
Mechanics' Lien Act is not applicable to this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Peterson respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
district court's determination that Peterson's mechanics' liens were not timely filed. In 
addition, Peterson respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district court's 
nullification of Peterson's mechanics' liens under the Wrongful Lien Act by reinstating 
the liens and ordering that Peterson be allowed to initiate an action to foreclose on the 
liens. 
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